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GENDER QUOTA IN THE BOARDROOM: 
THE DUTCH APPROACH 
MIJNTJE LÜCKERATH-ROVERS∗ 
Since 2013 the Dutch Civil Code has required a minimum of 30 per cent 
women (and men) on both the executive and the supervisory boards of 
companies. The law is based on the comply or explain principle: companies 
that have not reached the 30 per cent target on one or other of these Boards 
should explain in their annual report why the seats are not evenly distributed, 
how the company has tried to achieve a balanced distribution of the seats and 
how the company intends in future to realise a balanced distribution of the 
seats. Research among the 87 listed companies in the Netherlands shows that 
the average percentage of women on supervisory boards increased to 25 per 
cent in 2014, but that the percentage on executive boards increased only to 6 
per cent. While the 30 per cent target should have been reached by January 
2016, it seems only a matter of time before a quota with sanctions will be 
introduced in the Netherlands. 
I INTRODUCTION 
After almost two decades of sometimes heated debate, the Management and 
Supervision Act (the ‘Act’), including gender targets for Dutch boards, became 
effective on 1 January 2013. This Act introduced provisions aiming to ensure a 
balanced distribution of seats between men and women on both the executive 
and supervisory boards of large Dutch corporations (public limited companies 
(NVs) and private limited companies (BVs)). In the Netherlands, the two-tier 
board structure consisting of an executive board and a supervisory board is 
predominantly used. This means that the executive board and the supervisory 
board are two separate boards. In order to facilitate international comparison, 
this article will use international terminology: the executive board members 
will be referred to as the executive directors, whereas the supervisory board 
members will be called the non-executive directors. 
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According to the Act a balanced distribution means that at least 30 per cent of 
the board seats are occupied by men and at least 30 per cent are occupied by 
women. Companies subject to the scheme, but which have not reached the 
desired targets, must explain in the annual report (‘comply or explain’) why the 
seats are not evenly distributed, how the company has tried to balance the 
distribution of seats, and how the company seeks to achieve the balance of seats 
in the future. No further sanctions are included. The duration of the statutory 
provision is limited. The legislative items, in force since January 2013, will 
automatically be repealed from 1 January 2016.  
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the history of the target law 
and shows that it took almost two decades for it to be incorporated into Dutch 
Civil Law. The issue of gender targets for board composition began being 
addressed in 1996, with the debate becoming more heated thereafter. Initiatives 
based on company self-regulation did not have the desired impact, and 
legislation was proposed in 2008. It took another five years before this was 
actually included in the Dutch Civil Law. The debate has intensified since 
September 2014, when it became clear that the legislated targets would not be 
reached by 1 January 2016. Part III describes the relevant aspect of the target 
law. Part IV describes the development of the actual percentages for both the 
executive board and the supervisory board of Dutch listed companies over the 
period 2005–2014. Part V concludes with some remarks regarding future 
developments and outlook. 
II THE HISTORY OF DUTCH GENDER TARGET LAW 
A 1996–2006: Addressing the Issue 
Since 1996 there have been many initiatives, all with the same goal: increasing 
the number of women in top positions. In 1996 a governmental grant was 
awarded to a foundation that advocated that diversity is of strategic importance, 
and that a balanced business team will perform better than an unbalanced one. 
Furthermore, in 2000 the Ministries of Social Affairs and Employment and 
Economic Affairs took the initiative to set up an ‘Ambassadors’ Network’. This 
Ambassadors’ Network was an annually changing group of influential and well 
known business leaders. Group members committed themselves for one year in 
order to promote the appointment of women to senior and top positions. 
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B 2006–2008: Initiatives in Self-Regulation 
It took almost a decade for the Dutch government to take further action. This it 
did by means of a policy entitled: ‘Emancipation: It’s obvious but it doesn’t 
happen by itself!’ (‘the Emancipation policy’).1 In this policy the Dutch 
government set six objectives to support emancipation in a broader societal 
context.2 The policy presented these objectives as being beneficial for women 
themselves, for society as a whole, and for the future. Included amongst the 
objectives were: that more women should be employed, that women should 
work more hours, and that their talents and skills should be better utilised. The 
fifth objective was ‘to achieve a proportionate representation of women in 
decision-making positions’.3 More specifically, the policy proposed that the 
proportion of women in top jobs in the corporate world should increase to 20 
per cent by 2010.  
This in turn led to the development during 2007 of the Charter ‘Talent to the 
Top’, an initiative of the government, together with the employers’ union VNO-
NCW, the Social-Economic Council (SER) and the labour union FNV. This 
initiative strives to force government, business and women themselves to 
promote female talent to the top through structural change. The Charter, which 
was presented in May 2008, was initially signed by 47 companies and 
government agencies. Although none of the emancipation goals described 
above have yet been met, it appeared at that stage that the ‘sense of urgency’ 
had finally reached the top management of organisations. However, regrettably, 
the previously described Ambassadors’ Network ceased to exist due to the 
foundation of this ‘Talent to the Top’ initiative, which resulted in no visible 
business leaders addressing the issue on a regular basis. Signing the Charter 
‘Talent to the Top’ is voluntary; companies commit themselves to their own 
targets, and annually report on their progress towards these targets. 
However, the voluntary Charter was not sufficiently progressive for the Dutch 
Labour Party. The Labour party filed a motion instructing the Minister of 
Finance to request the Corporate Governance Code Committee responsible for 
changing the Corporate Governance Code to include targets for women on 
1 ‘Meerjarenbeleidsplan Emancipatie 2006–2010 Emancipatie: Vanzelfsprekend, Maar Het 
Gaat Niet Vanzelf! (29 December 2005) Overheid.nl!’ <https://zoek.officiele 
bekendmakingen.nl/kst-30420-2.html>. 
2 The Netherlands, Parliamentary Speech, Tweede Kamer [House of Representatives], 19 
December 2005, 30 420, nr 2 [author’s translation].  
3 Emancipatie: Vanzelfsprekend, Maar Het Gaat Niet Vanzelf!, above n 1, 11, Main objective 5. 
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boards of directors and supervisory boards.4 The motion requested a target 
percentage of between 25 and 30 per cent by 2015.  
A majority of the Dutch Parliament voted in favour of this motion (in April 
2008), and the motion was therefore adopted. However, the Minister of Finance 
ignored the motion and argued that any pressure on the Committee would affect 
and harm the self-regulatory character of the Corporate Governance Code. The 
Minister therefore suggested that the members of parliament should decide on 
legislation if they believed that self-regulation was not having the desired 
effect. In a reaction to the Minister the Labour Party stated5 that it would indeed 
file for legislation to impose a statutory obligation if the targets were not 
included the Corporate Governance Code.   
Nevertheless, the Committee did experience political, social and media 
pressure to include a specific target (a percentage) for women on executive and 
supervisory boards in the revised Corporate Governance Code. During 2008 
the Committee acknowledged the need for increased attention to women in top 
positions, and also highlighted the importance of diversity (including diversity 
on the basis of gender, age, experience and social background) in the section 
that addressed the performance of the supervisory board. The Committee also 
stated that companies gain direct benefit from promoting women to top 
positions since a key success factor for companies is attracting and retaining 
talent.6 
However, at the end of 2008, when the revised Corporate Governance Code7 
was presented, the Committee did not include any specific diversity target. The 
principle addressing diversity (Principle III.3 on ‘Expertise and Composition’) 
includes an encouragement to companies to pursue a mixed board composition, 
referring specially to gender and age. The Code requires that supervisory boards 
should also include in their reports their specific goals with respect to diversity. 
If the intended goal has not been reached, the supervisory board should explain 
how and within what period it expects to achieve the goal. According to the 
Code, the pursuit of a mixed composition should be reflected in the profile of 
4 Second Chamber of the States General, Parliamentary Paper 31083-17 (8 May 2008) 
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31083-17.html>. 
5 Second Chamber of the States General, Parliamentary Paper 31083-21 (6 June 2008) 
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/31083/kst-31083-21?resultIndex=66& 
sorttype=1&sortorder=4>. 
6 Monitoring Commission Corporate Governance Code, Rapport evaluatie en actualisering 
Nederlandse corporate governance code (2008) <http://commissiecorporate 
governance.nl/evaluatierapport-juni-2008>. 
7 Monitoring Commission Corporate Governance Code, De Nederlandse Corporate Governance 
Code (2009) <http://commissiecorporategovernance.nl/corporate-governance-code>. 
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the supervisory board. However, no such recommendation was made regarding 
the composition of the executive board. Furthermore, the Committee argued 
that a company itself can best assess how these goals can be given effect to, and 
this is the company’s responsibility.  
C 2008: First Steps to Legislation 
As mentioned, the Labour Party took the initiative to file for a Bill to introduce 
targets into the Civil Code for the participation of women on both the executive 
and the supervisory boards of ‘large’ Dutch companies — public listed 
companies and limited liability companies. It should be noted that the 
Corporate Governance Code applies only to listed companies, which numbered 
around 120 companies at that time, whereas the definition of ‘large’ companies 
would have included over 4000 companies. The proposal required a ‘balanced’ 
distribution of board seats, indicating that the term ‘balanced’ means that at 
least 30 per cent of the seats on both the executive and supervisory boards must 
be occupied by each gender.  
It should be noted that this proposal was part of a larger package of several 
proposals, all combined in one Act — the Management and Supervision Act. 
The initial Bill, before the other proposals were added, was filed to legislate a 
right for Dutch public companies to structure themselves on a one-tier board 
model. This would make it easier for Dutch companies to operate in an 
international context. This original Bill was not at all controversial and the 
desirability of a legal right to choose the one-tier board model was widely 
acknowledged. However additional proposals were added to this Bill, including 
a highly controversial proposal by the Socialist Party to limit the number of 
supervisory board positions to a maximum of five per individual person. The 
Socialist Party’s intention was to break the ‘old-boys network’, by virtue of 
which, they argued, most board positions are shared by the same group of 
people. The gender target proposal of the Labour Party was also attached to this 
Bill but, presumably because no sanctions were included, did not receive as 
much attention as the maximum board positions proposal.  
D 2008–2013: Five Years before the Law Became 
Effective 
It took almost five years before the Act came into effect on 1 January 2013. The 
Dutch Senate can only vote on a Bill in its entirety. It cannot pick and choose 
selectively the proposals which it votes for, or against. For this reason, it took 
some time before the Bill passed the Senate. In particular, certain critical 
aspects of the proposal of a maximum number of supervisory board positions 
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had to be resolved first.8 Therefore, although the majority of the Second 
Chamber voted for this Act in November 2009,9 the Senate did not decide 
positively to pass the legislation until almost two years later (May 2011).  The 
Act was published in the Dutch Bulletin of Acts and Decrees on 6 June 2011. 
However, at that time the date at which the Act would come into effect was not 
yet agreed upon, whereas the termination date of the articles of the gender target 
was already set at 1 January 2016, regardless of the date the Act came into 
effect. Termination would not occur for another two years, and so, on 1 January 
2013, the full Act became effective. 
III ARGUMENTS FOR MORE DIVERSITY 
Unfortunately, in the Netherlands the debate around the paucity of women in 
top management teams is still overwhelmingly discussed in normative terms, 
focusing on what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Yes-no questions are asked: ‘Are there, 
or are there not, enough women to fill the places?’; ‘Is it, or is it not, a form of 
discrimination?’; ‘May, or may not, women be entitled to a place at the top?’; 
‘Is there, or is there not, a glass ceiling, an old-boys network, adequate 
childcare, and so on?’ In the debate about ‘women to the top’, moral and 
economic arguments for more women at the top are used interchangeably. 
However, it would be desirable to make a clearer distinction between these 
arguments; this may hopefully result in the discussion becoming slightly more 
nuanced. Brammer, Millington and Pavelin10, for example, divided the 
arguments for more women on the board into i) arguments from a business 
perspective and ii) arguments from a moral (ethical) perspective. Furthermore, 
the authors divide both the business and the moral arguments into arguments 
for equal opportunities and arguments for equal representation. Table 1 
summarises the four perspectives in the debate about women on boards. 
 
8 There was criticism of the uncertainty of the validity of the decision-making process if a 
director, who holds more than the permitted positions, participated in the decision making 
process. The Minister of Justice therefore proposed an amendment under which such 
participation in decision-making will not affect the legal validity of the decision taken 
<https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20111209/nota_van_wijziging_3/document3/f=/viv
8wgyi1syc.pdf>. 
9 Parliamentary Paper I 2009/10. 31 763 nr A <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ 
dossier/31763/kst-20092010-31763-A?resultIndex=23&sorttype=1&sortorder=4>. 
10 Stephen Brammer, Andrew Millington and Stephen Pavelin, ‘Gender and Ethnic Diversity 
among UK Corporate Boards’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 
393, 394. 
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Table 1. Business and moral arguments in the debate about the absence of women 
on the board (Arguments derived from Brammer et al) 
 
  
Economic arguments 
 
 
Moral (ethical) arguments 
 
 
 
Equal 
opportunities 
The economic case for equal 
opportunities for women 
focuses on the fact that the 
absence of women is 
suboptimal for the company. 
Failure to choose the most 
suitable candidate affects the 
financial performance of the 
company. If certain valuable 
qualities are not evenly 
distributed among 
demographic groups, the 
company is structurally 
denying these qualities by 
excluding women from 
decision-making positions. 
Moral arguments for equal 
opportunities are based on the 
idea that it is wrong to keep 
individuals from the board 
simply because of gender or 
race, regardless of ability. This 
is a form of discrimination. 
 
 
Equal 
representation 
Economic arguments for equal 
representation refer to the 
direct and indirect interest the 
board has in reflecting the 
(demographic characteristics 
of) stakeholders of the 
company, such as consumers, 
employees and investors. 
The under-representation of 
women and other groups on the 
board excludes these groups 
from economic power, and 
should be ended. This argument 
is somewhat similar to 
arguments for voting rights for 
all. The presence of more 
women on the board would be a 
more just and equitable 
outcome for society. 
A Economic Arguments 
1 Equal Opportunities 
The economic case for equal opportunities for women focuses on the fact that 
the absence of women is suboptimal for the company. Failure to choose the 
most suitable candidate affects the company performance. Analogous to this 
argument is that an absence of women at the top signals that a company is 
operating less than optimally. If certain valuable qualities are not evenly 
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distributed among demographic groups, the company is structurally denying 
these qualities by excluding women from decision-making positions.11 
Companies with a higher degree of diversity on the board send an important 
positive signal to (potential) employees of that company; the competitive 
situation within (between employees) and outside the company (between 
potential employees) is strengthened,12 and performance will improve.13 Well-
qualified (external) candidates for directorships see that they may be eligible 
for a vacant position, even if they are outside the circle from which board 
members are normally recruited. In addition, diversity fuels internal 
competition among employees (and improves their performance) because of the 
positive signal to ‘minorities’ that everyone can achieve a directorship, 
regardless of their demographic characteristics.  
2 Equal Representation 
Economic arguments for equal representation refer to the direct and indirect 
interest of the board in reflecting the (demographic characteristics of) 
stakeholders of the company, such as consumers, employees and investors. A 
more diverse board provides a better understanding of the markets and 
customers of the company. Society also regards a higher degree of diversity as 
positive, and the reputation of the company improves. When the diversity 
within the company and its management reflects the diversity within the 
relevant market, a company is better able to serve and retain that market.14  
B Moral Arguments  
1 Equal Opportunities 
The moral arguments for equal opportunities are based on the idea that it is 
wrong to deny individuals board membership simply because of gender or race, 
and regardless of ability. Denying equal opportunity is a form of discrimination.  
11 Ibid 395.  
12 Caspar Rose, ‘Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish 
Evidence’ (2007) 15(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 404, 405.  
13 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R Salanick, The External Control of Organisations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective (Harper & Row, 1978) 106–7. 
14 Ibid. 
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2 Equal Representation 
The moral arguments for equal representation focus on the fact that the presence 
of more women on the board would be a more just and equitable outcome for 
society as a whole.15 The moral arguments are based on the social responsibility 
of enterprises and their management: being a good corporate citizen, for 
instance through non-discrimination, compliance with (social) norms and 
values.16 On the other hand, according to Rose,17 it is not appropriate to impose 
democratic ideas from the public domain (such as voting rights for all) on 
companies, because the principles in a company are very different from the 
principles in society. 
Although the moral arguments for increasing board diversity are connected 
with the economic arguments, for example through the impact of reputation on 
financial returns, previous research on the relationship between board diversity 
and company performance mostly relates to the economic arguments. 
IV THE TARGET LAW 
A 4500 Companies 
The target provisions apply to larger limited liability companies and publicly 
listed companies (‘PLCs’). These types of company are not subject to the 
proposed statutory provision if they meet two of the following three 
requirements:18 
a) The value of the assets according to its balance sheet does not exceed 
€17 500 000; 
b) Net sales for the financial year do not exceed €35 000 000; 
c) The average number of employees for the financial year is less than 
250.  
Companies are exempted from the target law if they meet fewer than two 
of the criteria. Thus, companies must comply with the target if they do 
meet two of the criteria. Based on these criteria the number of companies 
15 Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, above n 10, 395. 
16 Ibid 396.  
17 Rose, above n 12, 405. 
18 In accordance with the Civil Code art 2:397 para 1. 
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in the Netherlands that would be subject to this proposal was estimated. 
In 2012 more than 2.2 million companies were registered with the Dutch 
Chamber of Commerce, including more than 1 million registered as 
limited liability companies or PLCs. More than 5000 of these companies 
have a balance sheet total that exceeds €17.5 million, and more than 
11 000 have a turnover in excess of €35 million. Both criteria combined 
provided a number of at least 4500 companies that would fall under the 
quota proposal in 2012. Unfortunately, the number of employees proved 
to be a poor measurement because many (holding) companies are 
registered as having only one employee. 
B Comply or Explain 
According to article 2:397 of the Dutch Civil Code, a minimum of 30 per cent 
women (and men) on both the executive and the supervisory board is required. 
Article 2:397 states that companies must take this target of 30 per cent into 
account when:  
1) nominating and appointing executive directors; 
2) preparing a profile of the size and the composition of the supervisory 
board; and,  
3) designating, nominating, recommending and appointing non-
executive directors, in other words members of the supervisory board.  
The requirement is based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle: companies that 
have not reached the 30 per cent target on one or other of these Boards should 
explain in their annual report: 
1) why the seats are not evenly distributed;  
2) how the company has tried to achieve the balanced distribution of the 
seats; and  
3) how the company intends to realise a balanced distribution of the 
seats.  
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V THE EU QUOTA LAW 
In November 2012 the European Commission proposed legislation with the aim 
of attaining an objective of 40 per cent female19 non-executive directors in all 
publicly listed companies with the exception of small and medium-sized 
enterprises.20 On 20 November 2013 the members of the European Parliament 
voted this proposal into law with a vote of 459 for, 148 against and 81 
abstentions. Now that the proposal has been approved by one of the European 
Union’s two co-legislators, the member States in the Council need to reach 
agreement among themselves on the draft law and need to elicit the agreement 
of the European Parliament.21  
The EU quota law prescribes that companies with fewer than 40 per cent female 
non-executive directors will be required to make appointments to those 
positions on the basis of a comparative analysis of the qualifications of each 
candidate, by applying clear gender-neutral and unambiguous criteria. Given 
equal qualification, priority shall be given to female directors.22  
The objective of attaining at least 40 per cent female representation is to be met 
by 2020 while public undertakings (in which the public authorities have a direct 
or indirect influence) will have until 2018.23 The target does not apply to small 
or medium-sized enterprises,24 or non-listed companies. With respect to 
executive directors the proposal includes a ‘flexi-quota’ — an obligation for 
listed companies to set themselves individual, self-regulatory targets regarding 
19 The proposal uses the term ‘the under-represented sex’. 
20 European Commission, ‘Women on Boards: Commission Proposes 40% Objective’ (Press 
Release, 14 November 2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/news/ 
121114_en.htm>.  
21 Ibid.  
22 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Improving the Gender Balance among Non-Executive Directors of Companies 
Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures (14 November 2012) 6 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/directive_quotas_en.pdf>. 
23 In a public undertaking public authorities ‘may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant 
influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules 
which govern it’: European Parliament, ‘Public Undertakings and Services in the European 
Union, Economic Series W-21, Part I: The Situation of Public Undertakings in the European 
Union’ (Working Paper, European Parliament) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
workingpapers/econ/w21/sum-1_en.htm>.  
24 ‘Companies with less than 250 employees and an annual worldwide turnover not exceeding 50 
million EUR’: European Commission, above n 20. 
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the representation of both sexes among executive directors to be met by 2020. 
As for the Dutch situation, it would be better to refer to the EU quota law as a 
‘target law’ instead of a ‘quota’: the target of 40 per cent is not mandatory, and 
there are no sanctions imposed for non-compliance. However, the EU requires 
member states to lay down ‘appropriate and dissuasive sanctions for companies 
in breach of the Directive’.25 Furthermore, Companies will have to report 
annually on the progress they have made. Like the Dutch quota law, the 
Directive is a temporary measure and is set to expire in 2028.  
It is uncertain when the EU quota law will become effective, nor when the last 
steps in the legislation process will be taken. 
A 30 per cent or 40 per cent? 
The EU quota requires a minimum of 40 per cent female non-executive 
directors, which is also the case for Norway. In the Netherlands a minimum of 
30 per cent for both non-executive directors and executive directors is required. 
However, in practice the difference between 30 and 40 per cent is not visible. 
For example, under the Norwegian quota a minimum of 40 per cent applies 
strictly to boards with either five or ten directors, leading to the appointment of 
either two or four female directors. However, under the Norwegian law a 
scheme is included which requires an actual number of female directors (see 
Table 2 below) instead of the fixed 40 per cent. Table 1 shows that, for example, 
according to the scheme, 33 per cent is sufficient when there are three non-
executive director positions in total. In that case one of them has to be a woman. 
Also, in the Netherlands, since it is not possible to appoint 1.3 women, in 
practice it is only possible to reach the exact number of 30 per cent when the 
respective Executive and Supervisory Board consist of exactly ten persons. In 
all other cases, a minimum of 30 per cent means at least 33 per cent and a 
maximum of 50 per cent (see Table 2 below). 
For example a supervisory board with four members should appoint at least two 
women to reach the minimum requirement of 30 per cent. The female 
participation on the Supervisory Board then rises to 50 per cent.  
 
25 European Commission, Press release, Women on Boards: Commission proposes 40% 
objective (14 November 2012) 3 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_en.htm>. 
                                                 
2015 THE DUTCH APPROACH TO GENDER QUOTAS 87 
 
Table 2. Comparison of a 30 per cent or 40 per cent quota 
 
Number of 
members in 
EB and SB 
The Netherlands Norway 
Minimum 
number of 
women 
Actual  
% 
Minimum  
number of 
women 
Actual 
 % 
2 1 50% 1 50% 
3 1 33% 1 33% 
4 2 50% 2 50% 
5 2 40% 2 40% 
6 2 33% 3 50% 
7 3 43% 3 43% 
8 3 38% 3 38% 
9 3 33% 4 44% 
10 3 30% 4 40% 
 
Table 2 therefore shows that the minimum requirement of 30 or 40 per cent 
makes a difference for only three board sizes: 1) a board of six directors (two 
women in the Netherlands is enough, in Norway there have to be three),  of nine 
directors, and of ten directors. On the latter two boards three women are 
sufficient in the Netherlands, but in Norway there must be four).  
VI THE IMPACT OF THESE INTENSIFYING PRESSURES 
A The Dutch Female Board Index 
Since 2007, the Dutch Female Board Index has provided an annual overview 
of the presence of women on the executive and supervisory boards of Dutch 
listed companies. The Female Board Index follows the example of the Female 
FTSE Index of Cranfield University in the UK, and ranks listed companies 
based on the number of female directors on the Board. The last Female Board 
Index published the numbers as of 31 August 2014.  
The Dutch Index covers (all) 87 Dutch listed companies. Because — other than 
Dutch NVs — companies listed on the stock and derivatives exchange 
(Euronext Amsterdam) are not included in the Index, the Dutch situation can 
be analysed without the influence of foreign legal systems, governance models, 
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and cultural differences. Each year the number of listed companies changes due 
to delistings, take-overs and IPOs. In 2014, 87 listed companies were included, 
in 2007 the results related to 122 listed companies. 
B Companies with Female Directors since 2007 
Figure 1 shows an increase in the number of companies with at least one female, 
executive or non-executive, director on respectively the Executive of 
Supervisory Board. In 2007, 72 per cent of the 122 companies had no female 
director on either of the Boards. In 2014 this situation was almost reversed, with 
66 per cent of the 87 companies in the sample having one or more female 
directors.  
Figure 1. Companies with female directors since 2005 
(n is the number of listed companies in the sample, being all Dutch-listed 
companies in that year)  
 
 
 
 
C Female Directors in 2014 
Under this and the following headings the number of female directors in the 87 
companies that were part of the Female Board Index 2014 will be examined. 
This sample will be kept constant and will show the changes within these 
companies. A distinction is made between all 87 listed companies and the 22 
companies that are part of the Dutch ‘large caps’ (cap referring to market 
capitalisation) Index — the AEX-Index. These 22 companies are the most 
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visible Dutch companies, and are the first companies that are looked at in 
societal discussions such as those on gender equity. 
1 Non-Executive Directors 
Figure 2 below shows the increase in the percentage of female non-executive 
directors at the 87 companies in the sample. In 2005 5.6 per cent of all non-
executive directors, and 8.9 per cent of the non-executive directors at AEX 
companies, were female. This had by 2014 increased to 19.5 per cent of non-
executive directors at all 87 listed companies, and even 25.3 per cent of 
directors in the 22 AEX companies. 
Figure 2. Development of female non-executive directors since 2005 at the 87 listed 
companies in 2014 
 
2 Executive Directors 
Figure 3 below shows the increase in the percentage of female executive 
directors at the 87 listed companies in the sample. In 2014, the average 
percentage of female executive directors was 6.0 per cent for all 87 companies, 
which is almost the same as for the 22 AEX companies (5.8 per cent). This is 
only a small increase compared to 2005 when, respectively, 3.2 per cent and 
3.4 per cent of the executives were female. It is remarkable that the percentage 
of female executive directors at the AEX companies dropped from 6.8 per cent 
in 2011 to 2.8 per cent in 2013. When the number of female executive directors 
is small, the resignation of, for example, two female executive directors who 
are not replaced has a large impact on the percentage. This was the case in 2013.  
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Figure 3. Development of female executive directors at the 87 listed companies – 
2005 – 201426  
 
3 Compliance with Dutch Target Law 
In August 2014, only one company27 of the 87 listed companies met the Dutch 
target for both boards, whereas two other companies were very close with >30 
per cent female executives, but only 29 per cent female non-executive 
directors.28 Nine companies were in compliance with the 30 per cent gender 
target on the executive board, which was an increase of five companies 
compared to 2013 when only four were compliant. Sixteen companies were in 
compliance in 2014 with respect to the supervisory board, an increase of eight 
companies as compared to 2013, when only eight had complied. Furthermore, 
26 The 22 AEX companies are also included in the numbers and percentages of all companies 
(n=87 in 2014). The analysis is made for the 87 listed companies and their current position in 
the different exchange segment. This means that companies now in the AEX-segment might 
not have been in this segment for the whole period. Companies are excluded from the analysis 
when data was not complete for the respective years, for example while they did not yet exist 
or were not yet listed. This results in a minimum of 77 companies in 2005 (of which 18 AEX) 
to a maximum of 87 in 2014. For these companies the data was complete: Mijntje Lückerath-
Rovers, ‘The Dutch Female Board Index 2014’ (Research Report, TIAS School for Business 
and Society, 2014) 11 <http://www.tias.edu/docs/default-source/Kennisartikelen/femaleboard 
index2014.pdf>.  
27 Wolters Kluwer. Ibid 18.  
28 TomTom and PostNL. Ibid. 
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in 2014 seven companies (2013:2) almost met the legal requirements for the 
supervisory board, with 29 per cent female non-executive directors.  
4 Compliance with EU Quota 
In 2014, six companies29 (all with more than 40 per cent female non-executive 
directors) were in compliance with the EU target of 40 per cent female non-
executive directors. However five of these companies had no female executive 
directors, so consequently they did not comply with the Dutch target law.  
5 Estimated Growth Rate until 2016 
As previously described, the articles in the Dutch Civil Code with respect to the 
gender target automatically terminate, and no longer apply from 1 January 
2016. Figure 4 shows the real growth in the number of female directors versus 
the required growth. Assuming a constant rate of increase, by 1 January 2016 
the percentage of female non-executive directors will be approximately 22 per 
cent, and of female executive directors around 8 per cent. Figure 4 also shows 
what the growth should be in order to comply with the Dutch target of 30 per 
cent at 1 January 2016.30  
Figure 4. Real growth versus required growth until 2016  
 
 
29 DSM, Novisource, TMG, Snowworld, Unilever and Wessanen. Ibid.  
30 The annual increase is calculated as the difference between the percentage last year (17.5 per 
cent for non-executives) and this year (19.5 per cent). Ibid 10.  
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This means that, in absolute numbers, and for all companies together, and 
ignoring resignations, at least 52 female executives and 46 female non-
executives should be added to the respective boards before January 2016. At 
the current growth rate the 30 per cent target for non-executives will be reached 
in 2020, but for executives this will only be in 2033. 
VII THE FUTURE 
A Intensified Debate…Again 
The Dutch debate again intensified after the Female Board Index 2014 was 
published and it became evident that the gender target will not be met before 1 
January 2016. The effect of this news was given further impetus a week later 
when a Talent to the Top report confirmed the findings of the Female Board 
Index 2014 based on research among a sample of 800 companies that fell under 
the target law.31 According to the report the percentage of female executive 
directors was 8.9 per cent, and of female non-executive directors 11.2 per cent. 
Furthermore, this study concluded that the majority of the annual reports did 
not provide the ‘explanation’ required by the ‘comply or explain’ principle, 
which is part of the target law. Sixty-two per cent of the companies that did not 
comply with the 30 per cent executive board target did not explain their non-
compliance, while 57 per cent of the companies that did not comply with the 
non-executive board target did not provide an explanation.  
Jet Bussemaker, the (female) minister of Education, Culture and Science 
(ECS), addressed the issue on national television, and announced further steps 
to be taken. The absence of commentary from the other responsible Ministers 
is, however, surprising. It is true that emancipation is among the tasks of the 
Ministry of ECS, but the Management and Supervision Act, the legislation in 
which the targets are included, is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice, 
and the Corporate Governance Code is the domain of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. Both (male) Ministers have not yet expressed their opinions. 
31 These companies were asked to complete a survey and to provide the researchers with the 
requested board data: Babette Pouwels and Wilma Henderikse ‘Waar een wil is, is een weg’ 
[Where there is a will, there is a way] (Report, VanDoorneHuiskes, August 2014) 5 
<http://www.talentnaardetop.nl/uploaded_files/document/Bedrijvenmonitor_2013.pdf> 
[author’s translation].  
                                                 
2015 THE DUTCH APPROACH TO GENDER QUOTAS 93 
VIII POSTSCRIPT 
Recently Nancy McKinstry of Wolters Kluwer, one of the two female CEOs of 
listed companies in the Netherlands, wrote an article in the Dutch Financial 
Times (7 October 2014) entitled ‘Getting Women to the Top Requires Effort 
from the Company Itself’.32 McKinstry commented on the then current debate 
and stated that, ‘with the debate about female quotas raging again, there’s fresh 
focus in the Netherlands on how diversity can best be stimulated’. Although 
McKinstry noted that Wolters Kluwer was the only company in compliance 
with the target law and acknowledged that some companies would need such a 
quota, she also stated that ‘a “female quota” has never been the means or the 
motivation for Wolters Kluwer’. McKinstry finds the benefits to the company 
of achieving diversity self-evident: ‘[O]ur customers are diverse, so we want 
and need to be diverse, too.’ However, she continues that it does not happen by 
itself. McKinstry adds that the company expresses ‘a firm commitment to 
stimulating diversity of all kinds’, which includes ‘a conscious, active policy to 
nurture the best talent, including that of women’. She testifies that at Wolters 
Kluwer it was shown that ‘women are exceptionally good at teamwork and at 
leading diverse teams. This is a not-to-be-underestimated reason to cultivate 
female talent better. Diversity fosters diversity’.33 
She concludes with the following statement:  
[L]et us not forget why diversity — of gender, but also nationality, 
experience, age, skills — is important for companies. To be able to choose 
the best man or woman for the job, you need access to the entire talent pool. 
Diversity also creates more perspectives in discussions, leading to better 
decision-making — which has direct influence on a company’s results.  
Our ultimate priority is developing the most talented people, regardless of 
their gender, background or life preferences. As a company, we benefit from 
this. If all companies commit to this, the whole of society will benefit.34 
32 Nancy McKinstry, Editorial: CEO Nancy McKinstry Addresses Diversity at Wolters Kluwer 
(7 October 2014), Wolters Kluwer <http://www.wolterskluwer.com/Press/Latest-News/ 
Pages/Press%20Releases/2014/CEO-Nancy-McKinstry-addresses-diversity-at-Wolters-
Kluwer-.aspx>.   
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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IX OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
In the Netherlands the discussion is far from over. The pressure for a mandatory 
quota is increasing. Although I agree with Rose35 that listed companies cannot 
be compared to a democracy, that no one — man or woman — has a right to be 
appointed to the board of a private company, and finally, that the government 
should not interfere with the appointments at private companies, it probably 
will be the only solution. As an interim solution the Minister of Education, 
Culture and Science, together with the influential employers association VNO-
NCW, announced in January 2015 the establishment of a database in which the 
names and current positions of women qualified for (future) board positions are 
included. Executive search companies are bypassed by the database, which is 
available to companies that are looking for new female board members. 
The only possible way to avoid mandatory sanctions will be a visible steepening 
growth rate in female board membership in 2015. If in 2015 the real growth 
rate as shown in Figure 4 shows a clear and sharp upward trend, especially due 
to the appointment of more female executive directors, it might signal that 
finally the breakthrough has occurred. If not, for many it will seem that there 
are no more excuses not to impose a mandatory quota; positions will have 
hardened. And that will not be good for anyone. 
35 Rose, above n 12, 405.  
                                                 
